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1. Introduction 
 
Evidentiality refers to the epistemological basis behind speech acts, with lexical evidentials the 
constructions that indicate the types of information that support propositions (Cornillie 2009). 
While research on evidentials has increased in the last few decades, the argumentative role of 
evidentials has not been extensively examined. Understanding the way evidentials signal 
arguers’ standpoints and information sources could help elucidate how arguers reach mutually 
acceptable conclusions in their discussions.  
         Recently, Elena Musi (Miecznikowski & Musi 2015; Musi 2015) and other scholars 
(Rocci 2012, 2013; van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans 2007) have begun to 
analyze how evidentials and argument indicators invite inferences about standpoints, argument 
schemes, and critical discussion. For this volume, Musi has analyzed evidentials in a corpus of 
articles about oil drilling in the United States. Her analysis shows the argumentative role that 
evidentials can play in the oil drilling debate, and provides us with a valuable framework for 
studying evidentials.   
   The purpose of this essay is to identify topics in the study of evidentials, review Musi’s 
research strategies and findings, and invite argument researchers to continue the study of 
evidentials.  
 
 2. The general study of evidentiality and evidentials 
 
Researchers who study evidentials conceive them to encode epistemic claims either broadly or 
narrowly. Chafe, Palmer, and Lyons (Chafe & Nichols 1986; Lyons 1977; Palmer 1990), for 
instance, conceive of evidentials in a broad sense as “coding the speaker's attitude toward his/her 
knowledge of a situation” as well as narrowly “marking the source of such knowledge” (Willett 
1988, pp. 54-55). By contrast, Aikhenvald (2004) considers evidentials as primarily the 
grammatical categorization of information sources. Aikhenvald has identified several systems of 
evidentials around the world that mark information sources, with six semantic parameters that 
mark evidentiality grammatically: visual, non-visual sensory, inference, assumption (based on 
general knowledge), hearsay, and quotative. Similarly, Willett has found that languages mark at 
least three types of evidence sources: attested or direct knowledge, evidence reported by others, 
and evidence that is inferred. Direct evidence is typically marked in languages with perception 
verbs (i.e., “I see,” “hear,” “feel”). Subjective attitudes are expressed differently depending upon 
the modal (e.g., might, must), and forms such as possibility, necessity, tense, and voice.  
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 With the increase in the study of evidentiality and evidentials has come comprehensive 
cross-linguistic studies (Aikhenvald 2004; Willett 1988), along with focused analyses of 
European and South American languages (Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Hengeveld & Hattnher 
2015), and analyses of languages like Spanish in which evidentiality is not explicitly part of the 
grammar (Marco 2015). Some scholars call evidentiality a universal semantic category (e.g., 
Marco 2015), which has resulted in studies focusing on identifying the grammatical features 
associated with expressing evidentiality and the contextual conditions forms must meet to 
express evidential meaning.  
 Evidentiality is also recognized to play an important role in social interaction and 
narrative as well as in media discourse. Broad interactional and rhetorical practices can function 
as evidentials, such as reported speech, which Clift (2006) has shown can function as an 
evidential that indexes a speaker’s stance. The effects of evidentials have also begun to be 
documented. Aydin and Ceci (2013), for instance, find that people who use languages that mark 
evidentiality explicitly may be more vulnerable to suggestibility when misleading questions are 
employed. They argue that such findings are relevant in legal practice when multiple languages 
are employed.  
Besides semantic-grammatical analyses of evidentials, speech act analyses have also been 
forwarded to identify the pragmatic and functional roles of evidentials. As Musi notes, 
evidentials can facilitate an argument’s invitation to inference (Pinto 1996, 2001), for evidentials 
guide interlocutors to link relevant premises and help them discern the speaker’s commitment. 
Evidentials also function rhetorically to help convince audiences of the acceptability of 
interlocutors’ standpoints (White 2003).  
Three recent examples show that evidentials in argument are best understood by 
integrating their semantic-grammatical features with pragmatic and performative features. In 
particular, Rocci (2012, 2013) has found that Italian modals like can, may, and must function as 
evidential strategies in advancing predictions in financial news stories. Hengeveld and Hattnher’s 
(2015) new taxonomy of evidentials also resulted from integrating syntactic-semantic features of 
evidentials with their performative features. Their cross-linguistic analysis begins by 
differentiating the representative and interpersonal levels of utterances. At the representative 
level evidentials are organized in semantic layers that include situation, state of affairs, episode, 
and proposition. At the interpersonal level evidentials are organized in pragmatic layers that 
include expressed content, illocutionary intention, and the discourse act. Evidentials are further 
differentiated grammatically by mood, aspect, and tense. Finally, evidentials are distinguished by 
semantic scope relations that form four categories: reportativity, inference, deduction, and event 
perception.  
 A third example of a performative analysis of evidentials is the catalogue of argument 
indicators that mark critical discussion, assembled by van Eemeren et al. (2007). Argument 
indicators can standpoint expressions (“I really believe that”) and doubt (“I’m not sure”) in 
confrontation. Argument indicators mark requests for justification (“How do you know?”), the 
need to justify (“I have proof.”) and starting points for discussion (“We agree that”). Argument 
indicators can also mark types of argument schemes, like “similar to” (analogy argument), 
“results in” (causal argument), or “has disadvantages” (pragmatic argument). Finally, argument 
indicators mark the conclusion to argumentation (e.g., “I still disagree.”).  
 It is against the backdrop of this literature that Elena Musi frames her study. She sees 
evidentials as constructions that signal the information sources that can support a standpoint.  
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 Her initial data analytic strategy included gathering a list of evidentials from those 
studied in the linguistics literature, which included verbs (e.g., can, reveal, prove), nouns 
(evidence), predicative constructions (e.g., possible, likely), and adverbs (e.g., obviously, surely). 
This strategy seems smart, as so many constructions have the potential to be argument indicators; 
the list is a good place to start and learn from. 
Next, Musi discusses two theoretical issues that provide further understanding for the 
annotation framework she creates. She points out several features of evidentials that make them 
suited to analyze premise-conclusion relations: (a) evidentials can present a statement to which 
the speaker is committed, as evidentials express one’s subjectivity and stance; (b) evidentials 
invite inferences about what premises are relevant and true, and (c) evidentials suggest how the 
speaker wants interactants to participate. In this way evidentials have an interpersonal and 
rhetorical function, in that evidentials invite an interlocutor to engage with the speaker. Musi 
notes that high modal force is associated with degree of commitment on the speaker’s part, a 
point that could be further developed by argument researchers.  
Musi also reviews the linguistics literature on the categories of subjectivity and 
objectivity. She notes Lyons’ (1977) distinctions between the two types of epistemic modalities 
expressed in evidentials. Subjective epistemic modality is the speaker’s belief regarding the truth 
of a proposition, while objective epistemic modality is the possibility that the proposition is true. 
Since the interactional context is needed to determine if an expressed modality is subjective or 
objective, Musi follows Nuyts’ (2001, 2012) proposal that “objective” sources of information be 
seen as “intersubjective” ones, with quality information sources accessible to and shared by the 
speech community. For Nuyts, a modal is subjective when it is the speaker’s sole responsibility, 
but a modal is intersubjective if it is presented as being shared or shareable. This is an interesting 
discussion, with implications that arguments be presented in ways that facilitate the recognition 
of taken-as-shared premises with the audience and the building of common ground (Clark 1996).   
 
3. Research strategies for studying evidentials   
 
As indicated, Musi examined lexical evidentials in opinion articles on oil drilling in the US. Two 
research strategies utilized by Musi seem particularly useful to consider for anyone who wants to 
study lexical evidentials in argumentation.  
 One research strategy involves the choice of the data corpus.  Aspects of the data corpus 
such as topic, audience, and genre, may affect the use of evidentials and argumentation practice. 
For instance, the topic of oil drilling and its polarizing sub-topics likely shape journalists’ lines 
of argument in their opinion articles. In this context, how might oil drilling shape the way 
evidentials are used and interpreted? What is it about oil drilling that makes this topic a good one 
to study evidentials in argument practice?   
 Besides the topic, the audience is also an important part of oil drilling discourse. As Musi 
notes, various stake holders are involved in the drilling debate, such as oil companies, 
environmentalists, local communities and federal regulators. Do stakeholders play a role in the 
use of evidentials? Knowledge of each group’s standpoint in this context   might point to the jobs 
that journalists’ standpoints and information sources have to address to be effective.  
 Finally, the particular corpus of oil drilling articles was obtained from an online Twitter 
sample of the most tweeted articles on the topic. Argumentation in this media genre is important 
to analyze. However, what assumptions are made about argument when considering online 
audiences?  Since the opinion articles were tweeted, might the argumentative contribution of the 
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person tweeting the article be important for lexical evidentials?  Does the person use evidentials 
to magnify the premise-conclusions of the tweeted article? In sum, the data topic, audience, and 
media genre are all fascinating aspects of the interactional context for argumentation study, and 
potentially important factors to consider when studying evidentials. 
A second research strategy and contribution by Musi is her proposal of a multi-layer 
approach to annotate evidentials. Musi focused her analysis on a certain set of modals, verbs, and 
constructions that have been already studied by linguists. The set of evidentials (around 26) were 
then analyzed for their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features.  The first layer of her system 
identified each lexical evidential for its part of speech; verbs (e.g., prove), noun (evidence), 
adverbs (e.g., clearly), and predicative constructions (e.g., likely). The first layer also identified 
the type of evidence indicated by evidentials: direct, inference, report, and hearsay.   
The remaining three layers of Musi’s system use current theorizing about statements and 
intersubjectivity to examine the environment within which lexical evidentials operate. 
Specifically, the second layer identified types of statements or propositions that can be 
influenced by evidentials. Freeman’s (2000, 2005) typology was used, which distinguishes 
propositions as descriptions, interpretations, evaluations and logically determinant statements. 
Musi’s third layer identified types of modal evaluation (Nuyts 2012), expressed as whether a 
statement was expressed as a personal commitment to a truth proposition (subjective) or if the 
statement was expressed as a shared commitment (intersubjective). Musi’s fourth layer identified 
sources of information and their accessibility as argument premises. Singular sources of 
information were considered to be implicit premises known only by the author; shared premises 
were known by particular audiences; and shareable premises were seen as potentially 
controversial by a wider audience.   
   
4. Evidentials in the oil drilling debate 
 
Musi’s annotation scheme enabled her to identify interesting features of evidential use in oil 
drilling argumentation. Three findings are pursued here. 
A first significant finding was the distribution of lexical evidential in the corpus, and the 
types of evidentials that signaled particular information sources. Of the types of information 
sources encoded with evidentials, 80% were inferred sources of information (e.g. “Knudsen 
thinks those spills could be reduced”; Musi 2016, this volume). Moreover, over 63% of 
evidentials encoded inferences with verbs (e.g., “thinks”). These high frequency findings suggest 
that analysts could further an understanding of evidentials by identifying the specific evidential 
forms that co-occur with particular inferred information sources. 
A second significant finding is that the use of evidentials to present evidence directly 
was most frequently signaled by perception and cognition verbs (see, know) and the noun 
evidence. Musi’s contention is that direct evidentials in opinion articles function as strategies of 
objectification to frame the journalists’ key propositions as true and supporting premises as 
unassailable (Freeman 2005).  
This contention is affirmed in the Musi’s example from a NJ.com article, in which a 
journalist reports US Rep. Pallone’s arguments against off-shore drilling. Pallone begins by 
using the cognition verb, prove, to certify his causal claim and generalization that an entire 
coastline “could” be affected by a massive oil spill. This claim is followed by Pallone’s use of a 
factive verb (know) and a perception verb (saw) to present how “we” know that BP’s spill 
affected the whole coastline. This example is terrific for seeing how evidentials work together as 
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strategies of objectivity that give force to Pallone’s cause-effect argument and generalization. 
But it also gives force to other aspects of the example passage that may invite readers to 
overlook reasoning flaws and instead accept Pallone’s claim. Pallone makes several moves in the 
example that could raise critical questions for careful readers. For instance, Pallone’s original 
claim was that an entire coast line “could be affected by a massive oil spill” from his description 
of the BP oil spill.  Yet he does not produce another actual example. Instead, Pallone constructs a 
fictive citizen with a hypothetical example that enables him to state that his citizen would predict 
that if an oil spill occurs off Virginia that it would not affect New Jersey. Pallone uses the fictive 
prediction to emphatically reject it (“that is totally false.”). Rejection of the hypothetical example 
enables Pallone to conclude, then, that an oil spill “will impact the entire East coast.” Hence, 
Pallone uses the hypothetical example to engage in analogy argumentation to predict that an oil 
spill will result along the East coast like Florida’s coast. Yet Pallone employs no specific 
comparisons between the two coasts, a feature of the analogy argument scheme.   
In addition to the lack of comparison between the two cases, we don’t know how the 
journalist reasoned with Pallone’s arguments, nor do we know how the person who tweeted the 
opinion article reasoned with Pallone’s arguments. Still, Pallone’s use of evidentials to establish 
objective premises in the beginning part of his argument enables him to stage a counterargument 
that invites the inference that Pallone’s overall claim is likely to be acceptable. Unfortunately, 
this inference is based upon an undeveloped analogy and undeveloped generalization. Hence, 
evidentials can reassure readers about presumptions that may lead them to overlook suspicious 
premises and accept presented conclusions. Instead if inviting acceptable inferences, evidentials 
may help interlocutors commit fallacies.  
 A third significant finding is the pattern surrounding the expression of standpoints with 
high commitment. Musi found that when journalists presented their standpoints with high 
commitment, they immediately followed with multiple supporting premises that were easily 
recovered and recognized as shared with the audience. Musi’s example for this pattern was from 
American Progress, in which the journalist argues that “oil and gas are the wrong energy sources 
to pursue along the Atlantic coast.” This standpoint is prefaced by “It is clearer than ever,” a 
construction that appears justified by the premises that followed the standpoint. Presenting the 
two premises as shared occurs with the journalist citing six negative consequences of drilling that 
have been previously documented (premise 1), and citing observations reached by “an 
independent analysis” recognized by relevant communities (premise 2).  
While the discovery of this pattern is useful, the pattern may have additional components. 
For instance, the remaining portion of the example presents more elaborate grounds for 
supporting the two premises and standpoint. Premise two employs an authoritative warrant (i.e., 
independent analysis) to support the journalist’s standpoint, but the example continues to present 
evidentiary grounds from the independent analysis as to why there would be no “economic cure-
all” from oil drilling. So the observed pattern is expanded by providing additional grounds for 
the premises. 
  However, the observed pattern can be expanded still further, since part of premise two 
acknowledges the antagonist’s claimed benefits of oil drilling, but then rejects it with the 
“independent analysis.” The description of the independent analysis report provides a full two-
sided refutation of the antagonist’s claim of an economic cure-all. Moreover, in the refutation the 
journalist states that the report draws some of its evidence from oil industry data. Providing a 
refutation that draws from the antagonist’s own evidence displays a logical contradiction in the 
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antagonist’s argumentation that provides even more support for accepting the journalist’s 
standpoint.  
        Thus, the pattern of presenting a high commitment standpoint followed by multiple 
premises that are expressed and taken-as-shared is further buttressed by elaborating the grounds 
for the premises that also provides a refutation of the oil industry’s key claim. Together, these 
moves invite the inference that not only is the journalist’s premises and grounds true, and the 
journalist’s standpoint acceptable, but that the journalist’s strongly expressed stance is 
acceptable, too.   
 
5. A way forward in studying evidentials  
 
Musi found that direct evidentials in oil drilling arguments marked premises as objective, which 
enabled journalists to present their premises as relatively unassailable. She also found that when 
journalists used evidentials to express their standpoints decisively, with premises presented 
immediately after and presented as shared, that these features helped journalists’ arguments be 
more easily accessible and appear more convincing.  
Many directions could be taken to study evidentials in argumentation. Researchers could 
establish the usefulness of evidentials for facilitating critical discussion. For instance, how do 
patterns of evidentials operate in argumentative discussions across different genres? How do 
evidentials affect the understanding and evaluation of a speaker’s arguments? How do 
evidentials affect the stages of a critical discussion? In sum, how do evidentials function within a 
normative framework? Do particular evidentials play roles in staging opportunities for critical 
discussion?  
Studies also could examine the role of evidentials in persuading one’s interlocutor to 
accept one’s standpoint. Can evidentials affect the use of injunctive or descriptive norms in 
argumentation? How do evidentials affect the mechanisms that generate basic beliefs (Freeman 
2000), mechanisms like reason, perception, introspection, intellectual intuition, and conscience?  
Do evidentials function as heuristics by low involvement audience members? How are 
evidentials related to expressions of emotion, or to judgments of credibility?  
Finally, a problem for argument theorists has been to discern how and why fallacies are 
committed by interlocutors. Using heuristics in a discussion may be one reason why discussants 
end up committing fallacies. The inability to distinguish between fallacies and heuristics may be 
due to the speaker’s use of evidentials, which may solidify presumptions of argument 
acceptability embedded in the interaction context. Evidentials may mask differences between 
fallacies and heuristics, for as interlocutors use evidentials to render an argument initially 
acceptable, they may become suggestable to subsequent arguments containing logical flaws. 
In sum, there are many routes to explore in the study of evidentials in argumentation. 
Evidentials help arguers express their commitment or doubt. Evidentials help arguers indicate the 
evidence they use to justify standpoints. Exactly how evidentials can be used to facilitate critical 
discussion could be on our docket for future argument research.   
   
References  
 
Aikhenvald, A.Y. (2004). Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Aydin, C., & Ceci, S. J. (2013). The role of culture and language in avoiding misinformation: 
Pilot    findings. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 31, 559–573 doi: 10.1002/bsl.2077 
SUSAN L. KLINE 
 
7 
Chafe, W., & Nichols, J. (Eds.) (1986). Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology. 
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.   
Clark, H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Clift, R. (2006). Indexing stance: Reported speech as an interactional evidential. Journal of 
 Sociolinguistics 10 (5), 569-595. 
Cornillie, B. (2009). Evidentiality and epistemic modality: On the close relationship between two 
different categories. Functions of Language 16 (1), 44-62. doi 10.1075/fol.16.1.04cor 
Diewald, G. & Smirnova, E. (2010). Introduction. Evidentiality in European languages: The 
lexical-grammatical distinction. In: G. Diewald & E. Smirnova (Eds.), Linguistic 
Realization of Evidentiality in European Languages (pp. 1-14). Berlin: de Gruyter 
Mouton. 
Eemeren, F. H., van, Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, F. (2007). Argumentative indicators 
in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Amsterdam: Springer. 
Freeman, J. B. (2000). What types of statements are there? Argumentation 14 (2), 135-157.  
Freeman, J. B. (2005). Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic 
Problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hengeveld, K., & Hattnher, M. M. D. (2015). Four types of evidentiality in the native languages 
of Brazil. Linguistics 53 (3), 479-524. doi 10.1515/ling-2015-0010 
Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Marco, M.A. (2015). Introduction. Evidentiality in non-evidential languages: Are there 
evidentials in Spanish? Journal of Pragmatics 85, 135-137. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2015.04.002 
Miecznikowski, J. & Musi, E. (2015). Verbs of appearance and argument schemes: the Italian 
verb sembrare as an argumentative indicator. In: F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), 
Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation Theory (pp. 259-278). Amsterdam: 
Springer.  
Musi, E. (2014). Evidential modals at the semantic-argumentative interface: Appearance verbs as 
indicators of defeasible argumentation. Informal Logic 34 (3), 417-442.  
Nuyts, J. (2001). Epistemic Modality, Language, and Conceptualization. Amsterdam: 
Benjamins.  
Nuyts, A. (2012). Notions of (inter)subjectivity. English Text Construction 5 (1), 53-76. doi 
10.1075/etc.5.1.04nuy 
Palmer, F.R. (1990). Modality and the English modals, 2nd Ed. London: Longman.     
Pinto, R. (1996). The relation of argument to inference. In J. van Benthem & F.H. Van Eemeren 
(Eds.), Logic and argumentation (pp. 163-178). Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
Pinto, R. (2001). Argument, Inference and Dialectic. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Rocci, A. (2012). Modality and argumentative discourse relations: A study of the Italian 
necessity modal dovere. Journal of Pragmatics 44 (15), 2129-2149. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2012.09.007 
Rocci, A. (2013). Modal conversational backgrounds and evidential bases in predictions: The 
view from the Italian modals. In: L. De Saussure & K. Jaszkolt (Eds.), Time: Language, 
Cognition & Reality (pp. 128-157). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
White, P. (2003). Beyond modality and hedging: a dialogic view of the language of 
intersubjective stance. Text 23 (2), 259-284.  
SUSAN L. KLINE 
 
8 
Willett, T. (1988). A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality. Studies in 
Language: International Journal Sponsored by the Foundation 'Foundations of 
Language' 12 (1), 51-97. doi 10.1075/sl.l2.1.04wil 
